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"GROSSRAUM" AND "REALM"
New Terms for International Law
By DR. CARL SCHMITT
The following a'rtiele dealing 1mth neto developments in inte1'7t/1,t'ional law
i..~ not ea81/ reading. D1'. Schmitt. since he is a German professor. writes
in a rather difficult style: moreover. where C011t1non language is not yet
adapted to 11wdern develop1/tents. he has coined a number of new terms,
After all. there are some ideas which cannot be expressed in words of
one syllable. Great revolutions. such as the one through which mankind
is now passing, create new conditions and bring into the limelight old Ones
hitherto not clearly recognized. Since most of the recent revolutiO'l1/lJ1'1J
forces have come from either Russia or Germany. these languages have
contributed more than any others towards the new political vocabulary
of the world. "Lebensraum" is one such addition, The idea of "Lebens-
raum" is as old as hiBto'ry: Rome fought Carthage, American settlers
the Indians-for "Lebensraum." But what was a political real'it'll from
t-ime im.memorial has not become a political term until now.
In the following pages Dr. Schmitt offers two new political teT1ns:
"Grossraum" and "realm." We believe that he deals here with problems
of interest to those who. in the midst of this war. are giving sericrus
thought to the organization of future peace. Of course the author must
expect opposition from the adherents of the traditional school of inte'l"-
national law: nevertheless we think that even they will find stimulation
in his reasoning.
"Grossraum" literallll means "grMt space." Dr. Schmitt uses the
term to indicate larg~ pol'it-ical areas under the l~ading influence of one
pa,rticular nation. His term for these nat'io71s is "'realm" (Reu;h). For
eXQ,·mple. the Americas are in his tenninoloS7U a "Gros8ra'ltm;' and the
Uniteq. States is the "1'ea.lm" within this ·'Gros87amm."
Dr. Schmitt has during the last twenty·five years been a professor
at the Universities of Strassburg. Greifswald, Bonn, Cologne. and
Berlin. He has published a great 1nany important books and articles on
acute problems of international and German law. in which fields he i~
considered one of the leading a1zd most original minds in Germany.-K.M.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE
In the modern history of international
law tbe American Monroe Doctrine is
the first and so far most successful
example of the G1'ossraum principle in
international law. It is therefore a
singularly important precedent. From
it we must proceed when discussing the
international legal aspect of the Gross-
raum.
There can be no question of taking
the Monroe Doctrine as it is and simply
transferring it to other countries and
times. Our task is rather to make
clear to what extent it is an inter-
nationally useful legal concept. We do
not intend to increase the voluminous
literature on the Monroe Doctrine
by a further treatise but rather to
show the essence of the Doctrine in
all its simple greatness. We shall
therefore discuss neither the question
whether the Monroe Doctrine is a
"legal principle" or only a " political
maxim" of the United States Government,
nor whether it has a "quasi-legal" or
"semi-legal" character. We will limit
ourselves to three simple and incontest-
able facts:
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1. Probably all important textbooks
and encyclopedias of international law
deal with the Monroe Doctrine, irrespec-
tive of whether they affirm or deny its
"legal" aspect. It appears in every
important system of international law.
2. In practical negotiations of inter-
Dational agreements the United States
have, since the first peace conference
It the Hague (1899), prevailed with
great success, especially against British
opposition, in always having the proviso
of the Monroe Doctrine expressly or
tacitly recognized.
3. The statutes of the League of
Nations in Geneva in Article 21 re-
cognize the precedence of the proviso
of the Monroe Doctrine over its own
rules.
CHANGING INTERPRETATION
A difficulty is to be found in the
inconstancy of the Doctrine's meaning.
Originally a principle directed against
intervention of European powers in
the American hemisphere, it later
became the justification for the inter-
ve.ntion of the United States in other
American states and most recently in
European and Asiatic affairs. In this
way the Monroe Doctrine has been
invoked for a policy of strict isolation
amI u~uLraliLy fur Lhe USA as well us
for a policy of intervention reaching
across the AtlantIc and Pacific Oceans.
In 1923 Secretary of State Hughes
gave a very slgnil1cant reply to the
question regarding the real content of
the Monroe Doctrine, when he declared
that ita purport could be defined, inter-
preted, and sanctioned solely by the
Government of the United States of
America.
It is decisive for us that the original
Monroe Doctrine of 1823 is the first
declaration in the history of modern
international law referring to a political
sphere of interest and setting up for
this sphere the principal of non-
intervention by outside powers. It
refers specifically to the "Western
Hemisphere" of the world.
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The true and original Monroe
Doctrine was directed against the
monarchic-dynastic principle of legiti~
macy. This latter gave the sanctity of
law to the then existing stu,tu,s quo in
the distribution of power and frontiers.
It made absolute and legitimate mon-
archy the standard of international
legal order. On this basis it justified
at that time the intervention of
European powers in Spain and Italy
and should logically also have led to
intervention against the revolutionary
rise of independent states in Latin
America. The nations of the Americas,
however, since they no longer felt
themselves to be subjects of European
powers and refused to remain the field
of foreign colonization, did not permjt
any intervention on the part of Europe.
In a political Gross1'awn that had be-
come conscious of itself Europe was
not to interfere by insisting on old
titles of ownership and on the statu8
quo.
Here we have the essence of the
original Monroe Doctrine, a true Gross-
raunt principle. Three factors have
come together: a politically awakened
population. a political idea. and a politi-
cal area governed by this idea and
excluding foreign intervention. To re-
peat, it Is not the Monroe Doctrine as
such but rather its essence, the idea of
crci:lting nn intenlatiouw law of Lh~
Grossra.wn, which can be transferred
to other geographical spheres, other
historical situations, and other political
groupillg~. !L:; appllcalJJl1ty to Central
and Eastern Europe is not affected by
the fact that since 1823 conditions in
Europe as well as America have changed
considerably, and that, with regard to
the character of the basic political ideas,
the fronts have actually been reversed.
The western Democracies are now in
the position of the former European
monarchies of the Holy Alliance. The
monarchic-dynastic principle has now
become a liberal-democratic and capital-
istic principle of legitimacy.
THE "LIFE LINES" DOCTRINE
Next we turn to a doctrine which
is frequently mentioned in the same
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ureath with the Monroe Doctrine, the
doctrine of the .. Safety of the British
Life Lines." It is the anti type of the
original Monroe Doctrine. 'fhe latter
had in view a coherent geographical
entity: the Americas. The British
Empire, on the other hand, is not a
continent, but a political combination
of possessions cattered over every con-
tinent- Europe, America, Asia, Africa,
and Australia. The original Monroe
Doctrine was intended to exclude the
intervention of European powers in the
Americas in order to defend a new
political idea against the powers up-
holding the legitimacy of the stat'U.'J quo.
The principle of the "Safety of the
British Life Lines," however, from the
viewpoint of international law, is noth-
ing but an attempt to use the idea of
the legitimacy of the status QUO for
the preservation of existing possessions.
In order to have a case, all empire
scatter d over the face of the earth
must prove its continuation as such to
be in the interest of humanity. For
the lawyer of such an empire, parti-
cularly the RpeciaJist in international
law, it is therefore more natural
to think in terms of communication
lines rather than geographical areas.
Characteristic of this peculiarity in
the British way of thinking is the
pronouncement of an eminent British
expert.. ~ir William Hayter. who openly
said that the British Government could
permit revolutions in Greece and
BUlgaria; \..Iu t that in E~ypt there
must. be peace and order. so that the
great lines of communication of the
Empire, especially Lltt: ruuLe to India,
might not be disturbed.
The vital interest of sea lanes, air
lines, pipe lines, etc., from the view-
point of the scattered British Empire
cannot be denied. But while the
problems of the American Monroe
Doctrine have been treated in innumer-
able publications, there are hardly any
works of international jurisprudence
devoted to the great problem of the
"Safety of the British Life Lines."
Only here and there can one find
stat~ments, often in the form of legal
reservations, expressing this Doctrine.
Take, for instance, the decisive passage
in the note addressed to the American
Ambassador in London on May 19,
1928, by the British Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, which contains the
British reservations to the Kellogg
Pact. Here it is clearly stated that
there are areas in the world, the
welfare and integrity of which are of
special and vital interest to the peace
and security of Great Britain. Any
intervention in these areas could not
be tolerated by the British Govern-
ment, which could only sign the Kellogg
Pact if this were clearly understood.
An interesting conllict arose when
the Monroe Doctrine of America and
the Life Line Doctrine of Great Britain
clashed in the case of the Panama
Canal. Here the opposing interests of
the two worlds became apparent. The
struggle ended with a complete victory
for the United States and the Monroe
Doctrine, which, as a concrete Grossraum
principle, proved superior to England's
universal claim.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
England never abandoned her strug-
gle. For instance she has always
insisted on the freedom of the seas.
"Freedom" in every case of political
impurl.c:1Dce meant to hel" the under-
standable, specifically British imperial
interest in the world's R'reat Jines of
communication. Hence "freedom of the
st:ms," acconling to a formulation by
Wheaton-Dana. famous throuR'h its
citation in the Miramichi case (British
prize court decision of November 23,
1914), means: "the sea is 1'es omnium.
the common field of war as well as of
commerce." As long as England rules
the seas, the freedom of the seas is
limited by and coincides with the
interests of British naval warfare,
which claims the right of the belligerent
power to control the trade of neutrals.
"Freedom of the Dardanelles" means
unrestrained use of these straits for
British warships in order to be able
to attack Russia in the Black Sea, and
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10 on. Behind these terms implying
freedom for all mankind one can always
perceive the peculiar connection that
drives the interests of a geographical-
ly Don~oherent empire toward legal
formulations of a universal and gener-
alizing nature. This cannot simply be
explained as cant, or deceit, or by
similar expressions. I t is an example
of the inevitable co-ordination of
certain ways of thinking in international
Jaw with a certain kind of political
existence.
THE REALM, .4. NEW LEGAL
CONCEPT
On the basis of our discussion of the
Monroe and Life Line Doctrines we now
introduce the conception of a "realm"
88 a specific term of international law.
Realms in this sense are those leading
powers whose political ideas radiate into
a definite, large, geographical sphere,
which on principle exclude the interven-
tion of outside powers in this sphere,
and which raise themselves above the
state borders as well as above the
population frontier of a single people.
A sphere is not identical with the realm,
nor is a realm simply an enlarged state;
nor is every state or every people within
the sphere a part of the realm. No
one, for example, in acknowledging the
Monroe Doctrine. wonlrl npC'I::lI'e Bra2i1
or the Argentine to be a part of the
United States of America.
The introduction of this term of
international law i8 a necessit~l. The
future oC international law depends on
properly recognizing the actual determin-
ing forces in the relations between
nations and on making them the starting-
point for discussion and formulation.
Such forces are no longer "states," as in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
but "realms." The important point is
to set up in place of what used to be
the main conception of international
law-namely the state-a higher, more
realistic, and more modern conception,
which would be useful in international
law.
THE STATE, OBSOLETE BASI"
OF INTERNATIONAL L.4.W
Present international law, developed in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
and carried over into the twentieth
century, is nothing but a law of states.
In spite of certain modifications it
recognizes only states as subjects of
international law. In its eyes, realms
do not exist. Nevertheless, through the
ages leading powers were a political
and historical reality; there was, for
example, a "Concert of the European
Powers" and, in the system of Ver-
sailles, we had the"Allied Powers." Legal
terminology clung to the general term
"state" and to the legal equality of all
independent and sovereign states. In
its theories international jurisprudence
ignored the differences in rank between
the various states.
The frank recognition of these dif-
ferences was also avoided by the League
of Nations, although in Geneva the false
character of the slogan of equality in
international law was particularly obvi-
ous in view of the patent hegemony of
England and France. Traditional in-
ternationallaw is based on the pl'esump-
tion that all members of the international
legal community are "states" with
certain concrete and definite character-
istics.
IJALANCE OF POWER AS
GUARANTEE
International law as it has been until
now saw its real guarantee, not in an
intrinsic idea of justice nor in an
international consciousness of what i!'l
right (they both proved to be non-
existent during the Great War and in
Versailles), but-again in full harmony
with the interests of the British Empire
-in a balance of power among the
states. The fundamental idea is that
the power of the many large and small
states is maintained in perpetual ba-
lance, and that whichever state become...
too powerful and hence dangerous to
international law will be automaticall.\"
confronted by a coalition of the weake!"
states.
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This fluctuating, constantly moving,
and therefore extremely unsteady ba-
lance can at times really offer a
guarantee, that is to say when there is
a sufficient number of strong neutral
powers. The neutrals become in this
way not only the impartial witnesses in
a war between other powers, but also
the true guarantors and preservers of
international law. In such a system
of international law there is exactly
as much real law as there is real
neutrality. It is no accident that the
League of Nations has its seat in
Geneva, and it is for as good a reason
that the Permanent International Court
is at the Hague. But neither Switzer-
land nor the Netherlands are strong
neutrals who could in an emergency
defend international law alone and
unaided. If there are, as in the last
year of the Great War, no more strong
neutrals, there is in practice no more
international law.
A WEAl( CENTRAL EUROPE
THE PREREQUISITE
Traditional international law is based
furthermore on the unspoken but-
during the past centuries - essentially
correct presumption that this balance
of power shifted around a weak
Central Europe. It could really only
function if a number of medium-sized
and small states could be played
against each other here. Clausewitz,
the soldier and thinker, has hit the
nail on the head when he said that
the numerous German and Italian
states of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries were used as the small and
medium weights to be thrown, now on
this, now on that side of the scales to
maintain a balance between the great
powers. A strong political power in
Central Europe was bound to destroy
this kind of international law. The
jurists of such a law could therefore
maintain and in many cases genuinely
believe that the Great War of 1914-18,
directed against a strong Germany,
was a war of international law itself,
and that the apparent destruction of
the political power of Germany in 1918
was tla victory of international law
over brute force." It is necessary, not
only for political-historical but also
for jurisprudential discussion and re-
search to remember these circumstances
in order properly to comprehend the
present turning-point. For today, in
the face of a new, strong Germany,
this host of international conceptions
directed against a powerful Germany
is being mobilized again in full force
by the western Democracies and all
the countries influenced by them.
GROSSRAUM AND REALM
Not all nations are able to pass the
test of creating a good modern state
machinery, and very few are equal to
a modern war on the strength of their
own industrial and technical power of
production. In order to qualify today
for a first-rank position in interna-
tional law a nation must have a huge
measure not onlv of "natural" or
innate attributes, 'but also of conscious
discipline. It must have a heightened
ability of organization, and the faculty
to create alone and unaided the
complicated machinery of a modern
community and to hold it firmly
together. Traditional international law
has entirely overlooked this fact. The
task of modern international jurispru-
dence is to formulate the conception
of a concrete order of Grossraums
which does justice to the large spaces
of our present world as well as to our
new conception of state and people.
This can only be the conception of the
I·ealm.
Four different kinds of possible legal
relations would result here: first, be-
tween the different G'rossraums as such,
sInce these are, of course, not meant
to be hermetically sealed blocs, but
rather to enjoy economic and other
exchanges - in this sense, a "world-
trade"; secondly, between the leading
realms; thirdly, between the people
within each Grossraum; and finally-
on condition of non-intervention of
outside powers - between the peoples
belonging to different G.rossraums.
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The limitations of the former
conception of international law are
manifested by the fact that it focused
its attention entirely on the territory
of a state. The more far-reaching
problems of political reality such as
GroS$raum.s, claims of intervention,
prevention of intervention of outside
powers, zones on the high seas (zones
of administration, danger zones, block-
ades, stoppages of marine traffic,
convoys), problems of the colonies (which
are, after all, state territories in a
quite different sense and with a quite
different constitution from the mother-
land), protectorates, dependencies - all
this fell a victim to the practice of
indiscriminate "either/or" and to the
simple classification of all territories as
II state terri tory" or "not state terri-
tory," in which latter case it had no
legal standing. Borders are identified
with border lines. The possibility of
real (not only inter-state) borders and
border zones is excluded from the
thinking of jurists who see only states,
and who fail to recognize that there
are in reality many hybrid structures,
neither purely intra-state nor purely
extra-state. Even neutral buffer states,
whose significance is that of an inter-
mediate zone and which owe their
existence to agreements between realms,
llJ"Q treated Q8 sovoroign staws ond on
the same level with these realms.
l"JX£'D BORD~'RS AND ZONES
OF EXPANSION
The old system or International law,
l'ecognized in Europe under the leader-
ship of England and France, was
based on the differentiation between
an orderly European sphere of states
and a non-European sphere, free for
European expansion. The non-European
sphere was without a master. It was
semi- or uncivilized territory, waiting
for colonization, subject to seizure by
European powers, which indeed became
realms through the possession of such
oversea colonies. All realms of this
international system had huge terri·
tories for expansion at their dispo al:
Portugal, Spain, England, France, and
Holland in their oversea colonies; the
Habsburg monarchy in the Balkan
possessions of the Ottoman empire
(which did not belong to the society
of international law); and the Russian
realm in Ottoman possessions as well
as in Siberia and Eastern and Central
Asia. Prussia was the only power
which was merely a state, and which,
if it expanded in territory, could only
do so at the expense of its neighbors
belonging to the European society of
international law. Hence it was a
simple matter to give Prussia the
reputation of being a disturber of the
peace and a brutal aggressor, allhough
its territory was small and very modest
in comparison to that of the realms.
NEW CONCEPTIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD
While the European states were still
expanding into colonies, the emancipa-
tion of those colonies was beginning.
In the same measure in which the
oversea colonies detached themselves
from European leadership, the state
system of Europe, which was mainly
built up on oversea expansion, began to
change. The War of Independence of
the United States and the Monroe
Doctrine not only freed a huge part of
the world from the apron-strings of
Europe; they also created the first
modern GrUIj:Jra1t11z. bannlng outsIde
intervention. In 1905 the second noo-
European realm appeared, Ja.pan.
The development of the world in
recent times seems to point strongly to
the formation of further such spheres.
It is the duty of the international jurist
to recognize and to point out that the
world has entered a new phase of
international relatiol18. He must, as we
have attempted here, analyse this phase
and bring order into its conceptions. He
must see to it that theory does not lag
too far behind reality. The enumeration
of future realms and Gro88Taums and
their borders, however, is not his task.
This he can leave to the statesman and
the prophet.
